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Hamas and Pal es tin ian Poli tics
AITANA BOGDAN
The rise of Islamist move ments has long been a mat ter of great con cern for 
both West ern and secu lar Arab gov ern ments. While the first are sus pi cious of 
their ul ti mate goals, the Arab gov ern ments are fear ful of the grow ing power of 
any move ment they have trou ble con trol ling. The first Islamist move ments 
started to ap pear in the 1930s and in creased dra mati cally in num bers in the 1950s 
and 1960s. By the late 1970s they were al ready be com ing im por tant po liti cal play-
ers in many dif fer ent Arab states. At the time the main goals of these or gani za-
tions were to es tab lish an Is lamic state and im pose the Shari’a. As these radi cal 
goals proved to be un at tain able they were soon re placed by a more mod er ate and 
prag matic ap proach. This was not, how ever, the case with all Islamist or gani za-
tions. In time a split oc curred among the vari ous move ments. A mi nor ity of them 
turned to ter ror ism, at home and abroad, while the ma jor ity re nounced vio lence 
and fo cused on cre at ing grass roots net works to at tract popu lar sup port. It was 
this lat ter cate gory that in the end de cided to en ter the po liti cal arena through the 
elec toral proc ess. As a re sult most of these Islamist move ments moved in the di-
rec tion of es tab lish ing po liti cal par ties, where this was per mit ted by the au thori-
tar ian re gime in power1.
The aim of this ar ti cle is to fo cus on the sec ond type of Islamist or gani za tions 
in an at tempt to de ter mine whether their in clu sion in poli tics is bene fi cial or harm-
ful for the proc ess of de moc ra ti za tion in the Mid dle East. Be cause of the vast ness 
of the sub ject I de cided to se lect only one move ment, which I con sider to be rep re-
sen ta tive for this group, namely the Pal es tin ian Hamas. The ar gu ments com prised 
in this ar ti cle will fit into two cate go ries. On one hand I will at tempt to dem on-
strate that Hamas is un der go ing a proc ess of trans for ma tion, mod er at ing its ide ol-
ogy ac cord ing to the po liti cal and his tori cal con text. On the other hand, I in tend to 
prove that some of Hamas’ dis tinc tive fea tures make its in clu sion in Pal es tin ian 
po liti cal life an ad van tage for Pal es tin ian de moc ra ti za tion.
His tori cal Back ground
Pal es tin ian Islam ism repre sents a unique case in the his tory of Islamist move-
ments in the Mid dle East. On one hand, it ap peared later than most Islamist move-
ments in the re gion, ac quir ing its fi nal shape only at the be gin ning of the First 
In ti fada in 1987. And sec ondly, its ori gins are not closely tied to the de cline of 
1 Nathan J. BROWN, Amr HAMZAWY, Marina OTTAWAY, ”Islamist Movements and the 
Demo cratic Process in the Arab World: Exploring the Gray Zones”, Carnegie Endowment for Inter-
na tional Peace, no. 67, March 2006, pp. 1-19/p. 5.
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Arab secu lar re gimes. Quite the op po site, Pal es tin ian po liti cal Is lam, af ter 1970 be-
came eclipsed by the strong Pal es tin ian na tional move ment1.
As in other coun tries from the re gion, the dis as ter of the 1967 war trig gered 
an ideo logi cal shift in the Pal es tin ian ter ri to ries, as the fo cus shifted from the ex-
ter nal arena (against for eign ers and Is rael) to the in ter nal arena (against the rul-
ing elite). There fore, peo ple came to be lieve that the Pal es tin ian strug gle could 
only be suc cess ful if all secu lar Arab re gimes were elimi nated2.
Nev er the less, start ing with the 1970’s a se ries of im por tant events made 
the Is lamic radi cals in the Pal es tin ian ter ri to ries quickly lose the in flu ence they 
had ac quired im me di ately af ter 1967. The first of these fac tors was the emer-
gence of the Pal es tin ian Lib era tion Or gani za tion (PLO), a secu lar move ment, 
which took upon it self the re spon si bil ity of con duct ing armed strug gle against 
Is rael3.
The sec ond fac tor was the grow ing in flu ence of the Mus lim Broth er hood in 
the Pal es tin ian ter ri to ries start ing with 1967. The Mus lim Broth ers had a re form-
ist ap proach to the idea of es tab lish ing an Is lamic state, and they ap plied this 
ide ol ogy to the Pal es tin ian ter ri to ries4. The rise of po liti cal Is lam in the Ter ri to-
ries was par tially fa cili tated by the Is raeli au thori ties who viewed this new ideo-
logi cal trend as a use ful tool for un der min ing the power of Pal es tin ian 
na tion al ism5.
The Broth er hood was rep re sented in the Pal es tin ian ter ri to ries through three 
main bod ies that con sti tuted the base for the later for ma tion of Hamas. These 
bod ies were: the Is lamic Cen tre (al-Mu jamma’ al-Islami), the Is lamic As so cia tion 
(al-Jam’iyya al-Islami yya) and the Is lamic Uni ver sity. The spiri tual leader of 
the Is lamic Cen tre was Sheikh Ah med Yas sin, who later on be came the spiri tual 
leader of Hamas6.
All three or gani za tions were con structed around the re form ist ap proach 
of the Broth er hood. They were de signed to re form Pal es tin ian so ci ety in or der 
to pre pare the new gen era tions for the fu ture ji had against the state of Is rael. 
This is why the mem bers of these or gani za tions re strained from per form ing 
anti-Is raeli ac tivi ties and in stead con cen trated their ef fort to ward de-le giti miz-
ing the PLO7.
Once the In ti fada erupted the mem bers of the Mus lim Broth er hood were 
faced with a se ri ous di lemma. They could ei ther re nounce its de facto ac com mo da-
tion with the Is raeli oc cu pa tion or lose com pletely Pal es tin ian sup port for their 
cause. Af ter an ini tial stage of hesi ta tion, they set tled for a com pro mise, which 
con sisted in the crea tion of a sepa rate or gani za tion out of the Mus lim Broth er-
hood to take re spon si bil ity for its par tici pa tion in the In ti fada. Thus, in the case 
1 Beverley MILTON-EDWARDS, Islamic Politics in Palestine, I.B.Tauris Publishers, London 
and New York, 1999, p. x. 
2 Meir HATINA, Islam and Salvation in Palestine, The Moshe Dayan Center for Middle 
Eastern and African Studies, Tel Aviv University, 2001, p. 17.
3 Ibidem.
4 Ibidem, p. 19.
5 Grahan USHER, ”What Kind of Nation? The Rise of Hamas in the Occupied Territories”, 
Race & Class, vol. 37, no. 2, 1995, pp. 65-80/p. 66.
6 Ibidem.
7 Ibidem.
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the In ti fada failed, the Mus lim Broth er hood could shed all the blame on Hamas, 
and thus es cape pos si ble Is raeli re per cus sions1.
Hamas, which means zeal in Ara bic, be ing an ac ro nym for al-Mu qawama 
al-Islami yya (The Is lamic Re sis tance Move ment) was formed on De cem ber, 
8th 1987, as the Pal es tin ian branch of the Mus lim Broth er hood. In a way the out-
break of the In ti fada and the ap pear ance of Hamas were the con se quences of 
two dif fer ent but par al lel changes that were tak ing place in the Pal es tin ian ter-
ri to ries at the time. While the first event re flected the gen eral Pal es tin ian mood 
to wards the fail ure of all strug gle against Is rael, the sec ond event rep re sented 
the in creas ing con scious ness of re sis tance and con fron ta tion among Pal es tin-
ian Islamists2.
Through its ac tive par tici pa tion in the In ti fada and the grow ing aware ness of 
its re la tion ship with the Broth er hood, Hamas man aged to put an end to the PLO’s 
crit ics con cern ing the non par tici pa tion of the Mus lim Broth er hood in the armed 
strug gle. From that point on, Yas sin and other Mus lim Broth er hood lead ers be gan 
to ad mit openly the con nec tion be tween Hamas and the Broth er hood, for ward ing 
the idea the Hamas is noth ing but a re formed ac tive wing of the Pal es tin ian branch 
of the Mus lim Breth ren3.
Struc ture and Lead er ship
In what con cerns its struc ture, Hamas is com posed of three in ter re lated 
wings. The po liti cal and so cial wel fare wings deal with the or gani za tion’s 
so cial, ad min is tra tive, po liti cal and propa ganda ac tivi ties. The mili tary wing 
en gages in cov ert ac tivi ties such as exe cut ing sus pected col labo ra tors, sur-
veilling po ten tial tar gets, pro cur ing weap ons and car ry ing out guer rilla and 
ter ror ist at tacks4.
The ex ecu tive body of Hamas is the Po liti cal Com mit tee, which is be lieved to 
be com posed of around four teen mem bers, lo cated both within and out side the 
Pal es tin ian ter ri to ries. This body di rects the ac tivi ties of Hamas rep re sen ta tives 
over seas, the po liti cal of fice, the in for ma tion of fice, the para-mili tary ap pa ra tus 
and the De part ment of Af fairs of the Oc cu pied Lands (re spon si ble with the move-
ment’s chari ta ble and teach ing ac tivi ties). The Po liti cal Com mit tee acts a con sul ta-
tive coun cil and de ci sions are usu ally taken through con sen sus. In all its ac tions, 
the Po liti cal Com mit tee must take into con sid era tion the opin ions ex pressed by 
the ex ter nal mem bers of the Po liti cal Bu reau, the mem bers of the Gaza Strip Steer-
ing Com mit tee and the prison lead er ship5.
The ex ter nal mem bers of the Po liti cal Bu reau are based pri mar ily in Leba non, 
Syria, Qatar and Iran. They in clude promi nent lead ers, such as Musa Abu Mar zuq, 
1 Ibidem.
2 Khaled HROUB, Hamas. Political Thought and Pratice, Institute for Palestine Studies, 
Washington DC, 2000, p. 36.
3 Ibidem, p. 12.
4 Matthew LEVITT, Hamas. Political, Charity, and Terrorism in the Service of Jihad, Yale 
University Press, New Haven and London, 2006, p. 9.
5 ”Dealing with Hamas”, International Crisis Group Report, no. 21, Amman/Brussels, January 
2004, pp. 1-42/p. 10.
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Khaled Mis hal, Imad Alami, Mohammad Nazal and Usama Hamda. The ex iled 
lead er ship is es pe cially in flu en tial in for mu lat ing Hamas’ re la tions with the Arab 
world and Iran1.
The Gaza Strip Steer ing Com mit tee was ini tially led by Sheikh Ah med Yas-
sin and com prised Broth er hood vet er ans, such as Abd-al-Aziz Rantisi, Mah moud 
Zahhar, Is mail Hani yya. This or gani za tion plays a key role in the de ci sion-mak-
ing proc ess within Hamas, as it re flects the views of the in ter nal mem ber ship of 
the Po liti cal Com mit tee and its in put is so lic ited on al most every is sue. On some 
mat ters af fect ing the Pal es tin ian Ter ri to ries it acts as an autono mous body, while 
on broader is sues, like ne go tia tions with Is rael it needs to con sult with the ex ter-
nal mem bers2.
The West Bank po liti cal lead er ship has been se ri ously di min ished by Is raeli 
ar rests and kill ings, and all ef forts to re build it have been ham pered by the con tinu-
ing Is raeli mili tary ac tions. To day, it no longer has iden ti fi able pub lic lead ers, it 
does not op er ate co he sively and it is geo graphi cally frac tured, thus ex ert ing only 
a lim ited in flu ence in the re gion3.
The prison lead er ship has been an other key-ele ment in Hamas pol icy-mak-
ing, es pe cially be cause its mem bers en joy a spe cial le giti macy that al lowed them 
to im pose their own vi sion re gard ing the or gani za tion’s ac tions. It is there fore 
unlikely that any po liti cal ini tia tive within Hamas would suc ceed with out 
their con sent4.
Aside the Po liti cal Com mit tee, in the be gin ning Hamas was di vided in sev-
eral func tional branches whose op era tions were fur ther bro ken down by re gion. 
These branches in cluded:
a. a so cial wel fare and ad min is tra tive branch – the dawa – re spon si ble for re-
cruit ment, fund ing and so cial ser vices;
b. Al-Mu ja hideen al-Filastinun, a branch re spon si ble for arms pro cure ment 
and mili tary ac tivi ties;
c. a se cu rity branch – Je haz Aman – re spon si ble for col lect ing in for ma tion and 
iden ti fy ing, in ter ro gat ing and kill ing sus pected col labo ra tors;
d. a me dia branch – the A’alam – re spon si ble for pro duc ing and dis trib ut ing 
leaf lets, staff ing press of fices and ad dress ing propa ganda is sues5.
This struc ture re mained un changed for the first years of Hamas ac tiv ity and 
started to trans form only in the 1990s in or der to adapt to the con tinu ous Is raeli at-
tacks against the or gani za tion. Thus, in 1991, the Mu ja hideen al-Filastinun branch 
was in cor po rated into a rec og nized Hamas mili tary wing un der the name of Izz 
al-Din al-Qas sam Bri gades6.
Al though in prin ci ple autono mous, the Izz al-Din al-Qas sam Bri gades are 
known as a dis ci plined body whose com mand ers im ple ment poli cies de vised by 
the Hamas lead er ship rather than their own. Ac cord ing to Is raeli sources, the 
size of the Qas sam Bri gades re volves around 1000 men, lo cated mainly in the 
Gaza Strip7.




5 Matthew LEVITT, Hamas…cit., p. 10.
6 Ibidem, p. 11.
7 ”Dealing with Hamas”, cit., p. 11.
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Ide ol ogy
Hamas’ ideo logi cal plat form is best re flected in its Char ter which was is sued 
on Au gust, 18th 1988. At the be gin ning of this char ter Hamas de fined it self as a 
”Pal es tin ian branch of the Mus lim Broth er hood” and the gen eral con tent of the 
Cove nant does not dif fer much from po si tions taken by the Mus lim Broth er hood 
on the same is sues. How ever, it is clear even from the be gin ning that unlike the 
Broth er hood, Hamas’ main aim is not the ref or ma tion of so ci ety but the lib era tion 
of Pal es tine through vio lent ji had1.
In the char ter, the re li gious dis course is domi nant. In what con cerns Pal es tine 
the docu ment states that
”the land of Pal es tine is an Is lamic trust (waaf) upon all Mus lim gen era tions un-
til the Day of Res ur rec tion. It is not right to give it up nor any par of it” (art 11)2.
The so lu tion to this prob lem is, ac cord ing to Hamas, the re sort to vio lent ji-
had. Ji had, as set forth in the char ter is de signed to pre vent in fi dels from rul ing 
over the land of Is lam3.
In re gard to peace ne go tia tions and ini tia tives, the char ter clearly states:
”What are called ’peace ful so lu tions’ and ’in ter na tional con fer ences’ to 
solve the Pal es tine ques tion all con flict with the doc trine of the Is lamic Re sis-
tance Move ment, for giv ing up any part of the home land is like giv ing up 
part of the re li gious faith it self” (art. 13)4.
The Hamas Char ter also men tions other or gani za tions ac tive in the Pal es tin-
ian ter ri to ries, like the PLO, which is por trayed as a ”fa ther, brother, rela tive or 
friend” as the two move ments have a com mon goal. How ever, in an other sec tion 
of the docu ment, Hamas’ criti cizes the PLO’s secu lar ori en ta tion and its rec og ni-
tion of the State of Is rael5.
In ad di tion, Hamas’ ideo logi cal plat form has im por tant pan-Arab and pan-Is-
lamic ele ments. This is re flected in the way Hamas por trayed the Pal es tin ian cause 
as the fore most cause for Mus lims through out the world be cause of Pal es tine’s 
unique sanc tity and its spe cial status within Is lam6.
How ever, as the or gani za tion evolved so did its ide ol ogy. For ex am ple in the 
first two years of Hamas’ ex is tence (1987-1989), the pre limi nary iden ti fi ca tion of 
friends and foes pre sented no dif fi culty, as the pic ture was rather over sim pli fied. 
How ever, in sub se quent years, Hamas’ dis course en tered a phase of trans for ma-
tion as its lead er ship be came aware of the fact that it was un wise to ex pand the list 
of one’s ene mies. Hence, the move ments started to re duce and neu tral ize its ene-
mies when ever pos si ble7.
1 Ibidem.
2 Khaled HROUB, Hamas. Political Thought…cit., p. 273.
3 Ibidem, p. 269.
4 Ibidem, p. 274.
5 Ziad ABU-AMR, ”Hamas: A Historical and Political Background”, Journal of Palestine 
Studies, XXII, no. 4, Summer 1993, pp. 5-19/p. 13.
6 Khaled HROUB, Hamas. Political Thought…cit., p. 48.
7 Ibidem, p. 49.
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While at the be gin ning the Char ter men tions ”ene mies” in very gen eral and 
vague terms, leav ing much to the imagi na tion, since the early 1990s Hamas’ po liti-
cal think ing has been re-ori en tated, much un der the in flu ence of the or gani za-
tion’s ex ter nal lead er ship. This new at ti tude has been re flected in sev eral of 
Hamas’ ac tions, such as the es tab lish ment of con tacts with West ern states and in-
ter na tional bod ies1.
In the fol low ing years, Hamas’ po liti cal view of the ”en emy” and of Is raeli sup-
port ers re fined even more. In re gard to the ”prin ci pal en emy” Hamas be gan to clearly 
dif fer en ti ate be tween Ju da ism as a re lig ion and Zi on ism as a po liti cal move ment. 
Thus, the pri mary en emy of the Pal es tin ian peo ple be came the Zi on ist move ment 
and the Zi on ist en tity. This type of dis tinc tion can be ob served in the fol low ing 
quote, at trib uted to the lead er ship of Hamas:
”The non-Zi on ist Jew is one who be longs to the Jew ish faith, whether 
as a be liever or due to ac ci dent of birth, but does not re late to the above ideas 
and takes no part in ag gres sive ac tions against our land and our umma. The 
Zi on ist, on the other hand, is one who em braces the ag gres sive Jew ish ide ol-
ogy and be comes an in stru ment for the re ali za tion of those ideas on our land 
and against our umma. On this ba sis, Hamas will not adopt a hos tile po si tion 
in prac tice against any one be cause of his ideas or his creed but will adopt 
such a po si tion if those ideas and creed are trans lated into hos tile or dam ag-
ing ac tions against our umma and our na tion”2.
The re la tion ship es tab lished be tween poli tics and mo ral ity is yet an other cen-
tral is sue for Hamas’ ideo logi cal stance. As many other Islamist move ments, 
whether con scious or not, Hamas has the ten dency of trans fer ring in di vid ual mo-
ral ity (con sis tent with Is lamic val ues) to the po liti cal ac tivi ties of groups, states 
and in ter na tional or gani za tions, with out re gard for the huge dif fer ences be tween 
in di vid ual and group be hav ior3.
For ex am ple, Hamas has con stantly re jected such prin ci ples as those ex-
pressed by Hans Morgen thau, who stated that ”there is no mo ral ity in poli tics” and 
”in ter ests come be fore prin ci ples”. De spite be ing re luc tant to pub licly com pro mise 
its ul ti mate ob jec tives, Hamas has not let its ac tions be solely gov erned by re li gious 
and moral dic tates. Rather, it op er ates in a con text of op por tu ni ties and con straints, 
con flict ing in ter ests and cost-bene fit con sid era tions and is at ten tive to the fluc tu at-
ing needs and de mands of the Pal es tin ian peo ple4.
Through the re la tions it es tab lished with the Pal es tin ian Au thor ity (PA) and 
the Pal es tin ian Lib era tion Or gani za tion (PLO) in the post-Oslo pe riod, Hamas 
proved it self ca pa ble of po liti cal prag ma tism and po liti cal aware ness.
Since its foun da tions in the 1980s Hamas be came the sec ond ma jor player on 
the Pal es tin ian po liti cal arena, con sti tut ing an al ter na tive to the PLO and other 
pre-ex is tent fac tions. At a time when the PLO was seek ing ac com mo da tion with 
Is rael and the United States, Hamas em pha sized the need for a con tinu ous re sis-
tance un til the full re cov ery of Pal es tin ian rights. How ever, this sec on dary status 
1 Ibidem, p. 50.
2 Ibidem, pp. 50-51.
3 Ibidem, p. 55.
4 Shaul MISHAL, ”The Pragmatic Dimension of the Palestinian Hamas: A Network 
Perspective”, Armed Forces and Society, vol. 29, no. 4, Summer 2003, pp. 569- 589/p. 570.
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was both a bless ing and a curse. On one hand, its po si tion did not al low it a say in 
de ci sions con cern ing the rights of Pal es tini ans. While on the other hand, the 
same in ca pac ity both re lieved the move ment of com pro mises made dur ing pe ri-
ods of cri ses and gave it a flexi bil ity of ac tion that was not avail able to the Pal es-
tin ian lead er ship1.
The sign ing of the Dec la ra tion of Prin ci ples (DOP) in Sep tem ber 13th, 1993 be-
tween Is rael and the PLO be came a turn ing point for the evo lu tion of Hamas’ 
ideo logi cal plat form, as the pro vi sions listed in the docu ment con tra dicted its 
most ba sic prin ci ples. Firstly, the DOP re nounced vio lence and re lin quished the 
Pal es tin ian claim to 78% of Brit ish Man date Pal es tine, thus ef fec tively chal leng-
ing Hamas’ long-term goal of es tab lish ing an Is lamic state in all of Pal es tine via 
a vio lent ji had. Sec ondly, by ac knowl edg ing the le giti macy of the Pal es tin ian 
Au thor ity and its aux il iary struc tures, the dec la ra tion threat ened Hamas’ own 
le giti macy, mili tary ca pa bili ties and so cial ser vice net work2.
Nev er the less, the high level of popu lar ity en joyed by the Pal es tin ian Au thor-
ity pre vented Hamas from chal leng ing it di rectly, and forced the or gani za tion to re-
nounce some of its more radi cal claims and en ter a phase of mod era tion. This 
pres sure to mod er ate led Hamas to adopt sev eral poli cies driven by self-in ter est 
and self-pres er va tion rather than ideo logi cal con vic tions. Con se quently, Hamas 
sub dued its criti cism of the Oslo Ac cords and re frained from di rectly de nounc ing 
the Pal es tin ian lead ers as so ci ated with Oslo, such as Yasser Arafat. In the same 
time, the or gani za tion started to use its wel fare ser vices to in crease its in flu ence 
and popu lar ity at the ex pense of the PLO3.
Yet, Hamas could not af ford to dis tance it self com pletely from its origi nal 
ideo logi cal roots, for this threat ened to alien ate its more radi cal sup port ers. 
Hence, its lead ers de cided to opt for a mid dle path that best served their in-
terests. While avoid ing us ing strong re li gious ar gu ments to de nounce the Oslo 
Ac cords, they em ployed a more prag matic method by criti ciz ing the PLO for 
gain ing mea ger ter ri tory and aban don ing Je ru sa lem and the set tle ments to Is-
raeli con trol. Fur ther more, Hamas jus ti fied its re fusal to aban don ji had on prac ti-
cal grounds, such as the fact that the Is raeli with drawal was in com plete ac cord ing 
to UN Reso lu tion 242. This po si tion was by its na ture in her ently para doxi cal as 
the 242 Reso lu tion con tra vened Hamas’ ide ol ogy by rec og niz ing the State of Is-
rael. Still, did not stop Hamas from us ing this ar gu ment in its criti cism of the 
Oslo Ac cords4.
As a con se quence in the af ter math of Oslo, Hamas ap peared as a prag matic 
po liti cal force, with a flexi ble ide ol ogy. Musa Abu Mar zuq, the head of Hamas’ Po-
liti cal Bu reau at the time clearly ex pressed this per spec tive by stat ing that tac tics 
and poli cies could change, de pend ing on the ad van tage to be gained5.
An other key his tori cal mo ment for Hamas’ re la tions with the PA and PLO 
was the sign ing on Sep tem ber 28, 1995 of the Oslo II Agree ments. At the time, the 
1 Khaled HROUB, ”Hamas After Shaykh Yasin and Rantisi”, Journal of Palestine Studies, 
vol. 33, no. 4, Summer 2004, pp. 21-38/p. 23.
2 Shai GRUBER, ”Hamas: Pragmatic Ideology”, al Nakhlah – The Fletcher School Journal for 
Issues Related to South East Asia and Islamic Civilization, Spring 2007, pp. 1-10/p. 5.
3 Ibidem.
4 Ibidem.
5 Ibidem, p. 6.
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Pal es tin ian Au thor ity found it self un der con sid er able in ter na tional pres sure of 
put ting an end to Hamas’ ter ror ist ac tivi ties, which was re flected in Ar ti cle 14.3 of 
the agree ment. Hamas was also torn be tween the need to pre serve some of its 
more ba sic ideo logi cal prin ci ples and the threat of en ter ing an armed con flict with 
the PA. The or gani za tion’s so lu tion was to de velop a pol icy of con trolled vio lence 
that was for mal ized in a 1995 agree ment be tween Hamas and the PLO. Ac cord ing 
to the agree ment, Hamas would re frain from at tacks against Is rael from PA-con-
trolled ar eas, but left open the pos si bil ity of at tacks from ar eas re main ing un der Is-
raeli con trol. This agree ment is yet un der proof of Hamas’ prag ma tism and 
aware ness of the po liti cal con text1.
A third im por tant re-evalua tion of Hamas’ ideo logi cal stance took place in 
1996 in the con text of the first Pal es tin ian elec tions. Islamist think ers dis tin guish 
be tween four main strate gies that mark the be hav ior of Is lamic move ments: re-
form ist (op er at ing through edu ca tion and preach ing), com mu nal (fo cus ing on 
so cial ser vices), po liti cal (op er at ing through mass mo bi li za tion) and com bat-
ant-po liti cal (use mili tary force to put pres sure on the rul ing el ites). In re al ity, 
start ing with the 1940s most Is lamic move ments, de pend ing on the so cial and 
po liti cal con text, have adopted mixed ele ments from these strate gies. There fore 
it comes as no sur prise, that a close study of Hamas’ strate gies would re veal the 
same type of ap proach. More over, we en coun ter here the same am bi gu ity I 
have dis cussed in the pre vi ous chap ter, in what con cerns adopt ing a firm po si-
tion on key is sues. As such Hamas nei ther fully ac cepted, nor to tally re jected 
the PA’s le giti macy, which be comes ap par ent if we look at the or gani za tion’s 
be hav ior over the is sue of par tici pat ing in the PA’s ex ecu tive and rep re sen ta tive 
in sti tu tions2.
On one hand, Hamas needed ac cess to the power and re sources of fered 
by the Pal es tin ian Au thor ity in or der to en sure its sur vival and con tinu ous 
growth. On the other hand, col labo rat ing with the PA would have lead to a 
se ri ous de crease in the or gani za tion’s le giti macy and popu lar ity, es pe cially as 
this de ci sion could have been in ter preted as a de via tion from the Is lamic prin-
ci ples. In the end, it was pre cisely this di lemma that de fined Hamas’ strat egy 
for the fu ture3.
In his book The Pal es tin ian Hamas, Shaul Mis hal iden ti fies four pos si ble 
strate gies that Hamas could adopt in re gard to par tici pa tion in elec tions and at-
tempts to evalu ate the pos si ble ad van tages and dis ad van tages of each of the 
four al ter na tives:
One: Hamas par tici pates in the elec tions
Two: Hamas boy cotts the elec tions and is con tented with call ing the peo ple 
also to boy cott the elec tions
Third: Hamas boy cotts the elec tions and also at tempts to dis rupt them by 
force in or der to de-le giti mize them as well as the whole peace proc ess
Fourth: Hamas par tici pates un der a dif fer ent name4.
1 Ibidem.
2 Shaul MISHAL, Avraham SELA, The Palestinian Hamas: Vision, Violence and Coexistence, 
Columbia University Press, New York, 2000, p. 51.
3 Ibidem, p. 52.
4 Ibidem, p. 54.
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Ta ble 1
Ad van tages and Dis ad van tages of the Al ter na tive Po si tions To ward the Elec tions1
Alternative Advantages Disadvantages
1.  Hamas 
participates in 
the elections
Gaining the highest 
percentage of the votes
Confirming the movement’s 
popularity
Preventing political isolation
Preserving the popular support 
won during the Intifada
Securing a greater chance to 
influence the evolution of 
the Palestinian politics and 
especially of the peace process 
Difficulty in playing both the 
role of political participation 
and violent resistance
Giving significant legitimacy 
to elections, thus indicating 
Hamas’ compromise toward 
the two-state solution
If it does not win a majority, the 
act will appear as a reflection 
of popular consensus
2.  Hamas 
boycotts the 
elections 
and calls the 
people also to 
boycott
Diminishes the legitimacy of the 
elections and consequently of 
the entire negotiation process
If it manages to stop the elections 
entirely then it puts a stop to 
the process of negotiations




Political isolation of Hamas, 
which may lead to an increase 
in the strength of Fattah
The movement loses the 
political warranty that 
supports the policy of 
resistance to the occupation





It may lead to the outbreak of 
civil war, for which Hamas 
would be held responsible 
by the Palestinian people
It may not succeed in foiling 
the elections which means 
popular losses in addition 
to human casualties
The PA may force the organization 
into political isolation
4.  Participation 
under a 
different name
Guaranteeing non-isolation and 
preservation of popular basis
It may not gain the same 
percentage of votes, as 
through participation in 
the name of Hamas
Confusing the public
In 1996 in spite of the in ter nal de bate, the po liti cal lead er ship re mained op-
posed to par tici pa tion. They sup ported their de ci sion by mak ing ref er ence to 
sev eral prac ti cal con sid era tions. Firstly, al though the elec tions were to be held 
un der in ter na tional su per vi sion, it was doubt ful they would be fair. By adopt ing 
a ma jori tarian method, rather than pro por tional rep re sen ta tion, Arafat had ef fec-
tively in creased the chances of Fat tah, the rul ing party at the ex pense of the other 
popu lar po liti cal forces. Sec ondly, even if the elec tions were fair Hamas had to 
1 Ibidem.
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evalu ate which of the four al ter na tives was most bene fi cial. Ac cord ing to a poll 
con ducted in May 1995 by the Pal es tin ian Re search Cen tre in Nablus, Hamas had 
only 12 per cent of the popu la tion’s sup port, hence its chances of win ning were 
close to zero1.
There were also con sid er able dif fer ences in opin ion be tween the Hamas lead-
er ship lo cated in the Gaza Strip and those from the West Bank. Be cause of the PA’s 
tighter con trol in the Gaza Strip, the for mer were more in clined to par tici pate in 
elec tions, than the lat ter2.
In the end, Hamas reached a com pro mise with the PA, by agree ing to do not 
more than pas sively boy cott the elec tions and not to in ter fere with the Pal es tin ian 
pub lic’s free dom to de cide. Mis hal de fined Hamas’ at ti tude as a kind of ”posi tive 
am biva lence”. In prac tice this meant avoid ing of fi cial par tici pa tion in elec tions 
while at the same time dis play ing an in for mal pres ence in the elec tion proc ess to 
avoid po liti cal mar gin ali za tion3.
On the other side, Yasser Arafat, the leader of the Pal es tin ian Au thor ity pur-
sued a two-fold pol icy when it came to Hamas aimed at both co-opt ing and weak-
en ing it. On one hand he started a sys tem atic crack down, by ar rest ing Hamas 
ac tiv ists and clos ing the move ment’s news pa per (Wa tan). In the same time, how-
ever, he held of fi cial talks with Hamas lead ers en cour ag ing them to par tici pate in 
the elec tions. He even of fered to ex tend the can di date reg is tra tion pe riod be yond 
that stipu lated in the elec tion law to give the Hamas lead er ship more time to take 
a de ci sion re gard ing par tici pa tion4.
The situa tion changed dra mati cally with the new Pal es tin ian elec tions in 
2006, yet an other turn ing point in Hamas’ ideo logi cal and po liti cal evo lu tion. The 
death of Yasser Arafat and the de cline of the rul ing party Fa tah were only two of 
the key fac tors that de ter mined Hamas lead er ship to ac tively par tici pate in the 
elec toral proc ess, some thing they had re fused to do ten years be fore.
The pe riod be tween the out break of the Sec ond In ti fada in 2000 and the Pal-
es tin ian leg is la tive elec tions in 2006 can be char ac ter ized by Hamas’ short re lapse 
into ide ol ogy and then a re turn to prag ma tism. The Al-Aqsa In ti fada in creased 
popu lar sup port for Hamas and al lowed the or gani za tion to reach the same power 
status as that en joyed by Fat tah. Be tween 2000 and 2004 there was a pat tern of ris-
ing Hamas sup port paired with fail ing Fat tah sup port that con cluded with Hamas 
re ceiv ing 44.45 per cent of the votes com pared to Fat tah’s 41.43 per cent in the 2006 
Pal es tin ian leg is la tive elec tions. With these votes, Hamas man aged to gain an over-
whelm ing par lia men tary ma jor ity: 74 seats com pared to the 45 of Fat tah5.
Hamas’ re lapse into a rigid ideo logi cal stance is most no tice able through its 
be hav ior at the be gin ning of the Sec ond In ti fada. In early March 2000, when the In-
ti fada was en ter ing its sixth month, Hamas launched the first sui cide at tack since 
1997. Through these vio lent meas ures, the move ment man aged to re gain its po si-
tion at the fore front of Pal es tin ian poli tics and out bid Fat tah and all other po liti cal 
and mili tary fac tions. Fur ther more, sui cide bomb ings were not the only meth ods 
1 Ibidem, p. 58.
2 Ibidem.
3 Ibidem.
4 Lamis ANDONI, ”The Palestinian Elections: Moving Toward Democracy or One-Party 
Rule?”, Journal of Palestine Studies, vol. 25, no. 3, Spring 1996, pp. 5-16/p. 7.
5 Shai GRUBER, ”Hamas: Pragmatic Ideology”, cit., p. 6.
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used by Hamas to strengthen its po si tion, its also de ployed road side bombs, or-
gan ized armed at tacks on IDF posts and tar geted set tle ments and mili tary in stal la-
tions with mor tars, gre nades and Qas sam mis siles1.
This situa tion lasted up to 2003, when with the help of the Egyp tians and 
Ameri can sup port, Hamas was per suaded into de clar ing a hudna, a one-sided 
cease fire that was to last for one year. Here we can no tice again, the prag matic char-
ac ter of Hamas’ ac tions, who re al ized that it had more to gain from ac cept ing this 
com pro mise then by con tinu ing with ter ror ist at tacks. It had be come clear at the 
time that the Pal es tin ian popu la tion were not will ing to sup port any longer an or-
gani za tion that con tinu ously at tracted Is raeli at tacks in the Ter ri to ries. How ever, 
Is rael de cided not to re spect the pro vi sion of the agree ment and on 21 Au gust 
2003, seven weeks into the un de clared truce, Is raeli forces as sas si nated Isma’il 
Abu Shanab, one of the more mod er ate voices within Hamas and the ”en gi neer” 
of the hudna. An gered by this ac tion, Hamas re sumed its sui cide at tacks2.
Af ter the death of Yasser Arafat in 2004, Hamas’ ide ol ogy un der went an other 
sig nifi cant trans for ma tion, eas ily no tice able in the or gani za tion’s elec toral plat-
form drafted for its cam paign in the fall of 2005. This draft was pro posed to the 
other Pal es tin ian fac tions in May 2006 by a vic to ri ous Hamas as a ba sis for a coa li-
tion cabi net. Al though Hamas lead ers con tinu ously em pha sized their strong ad her-
ence to the or gani za tion’s ba sic prin ci ples, the afore men tioned docu ment clearly 
re veals a dra matic change in ide ol ogy. The four teen-page Elec toral Plat form for 
Change and Re form con sti tutes the most de tailed vi sion that Hamas has ever pre-
sented con cern ing all as pects of Pal es tin ian life. What is most sur pris ing about this 
docu ment is the vir tual ab sence of mili tary re sis tance from the plat form. In the sin-
gle di rect ref er ence to “armed strug gle” the em pha sis is on the right to end the oc-
cu pa tion by us ing all means avail able, in clud ing mili tary ones. Fur ther more, the 
par tici pa tion in elec tions is pre sented as a way of sup port ing the re sis tance3.
In ad di tion, the docu ment fo cuses mostly on the do mes tic scene, lay ing par ticu-
lar em pha sis on gov ern ance and re form. In fact, re li gious ref er ences are rela tively 
few, only amount ing to about a page and a half out of the docu ment’s four teen 
pages. De spite be ing very few the ref er ences to Is lam are nev er the less very im por-
tant for the un der stand ing of Hamas’ elec toral plat form. Is lam is clearly men tioned 
as a ba sic ref er ence point in six vi tal fields: edu ca tion, so cial poli cies, re li gious guid-
ance, leg is la tive pol icy, fam ily is sues and cul ture poli cies. The re main ing eleven ar-
ti cles of the elec toral plat form (in ter nal poli tics, for eign pol icy, ad min is tra tive 
re form, pub lic free doms and citi zens rights, youth is sues, hous ing pol icy, health 
and en vi ron ment pol icy, ag ri cul ture pol icy, eco nomic, fi nan cial and fis cal poli cies, 
la bor is sues and trans port poli cies) make no men tion of re lig ion what so ever4.
The same ideo logi cal shift can be ob served in the cabi net plat form docu ment 
de liv ered by Hamas Prime Min is ter, Is mail Hani yeh on 27 March 2006 in a speech 
be fore the newly elected Par lia ment. All through out the speech, Hani yeh’s tone was 
mod er ate and con cilia tory to ward the other Pal es tin ian fac tions. The theme of “dia-
logue, co op era tion and con sul ta tions” was a con stant. Nev er the less, Hamas did not 
1 Khaled HROUB, ”Hamas After Shaykh Yasin and Rantisi”, cit., p. 26.
2 Ibidem, p. 27.
3 Khaled HROUB, ”A ’New Hamas’ Through its New Documents”, Journal of Palestine 
Studies, no. 140, Summer 2006, pp. 6-24/p. 8.
4 Ibidem, pp. 11-12.
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sub stan tially al ter its po si tion re gard ing two sig nifi cant points: the rec og ni tion of 
the PLO-Is rael agree ments and the two-state so lu tion pro posed by the in ter na tional 
reso lu tions on Pal es tine. Hani yeh did not com pletely re ject these points, but prom-
ised that his gov ern ment will deal with both ”with high na tional re spon si bil ity” 
while pro tect ing the rights and in ter ests of the peo ple and na tional prin ci ples1.
All in all it’s clear that both these docu ments in di cate Hamas’ de sire to pre sent 
it self as a mod er ate Islamist move ment that can be trusted by both secu lar and re li-
gious Pal es tini ans. Fur ther more, al though this ideo logi cal evo lu tion has been pro-
moted by the mid dle rank ing lead er ship (tech no crats and West ern-edu cated elite) 
with some of the more or tho dox ele ments ex press ing their res er va tions, there has 
been no visi ble in ter nal rift con cern ing the new di rec tion, which ap pears to have 
been em braced and ad vo cated by all mem bers of the move ments2.
Po liti cal In te gra tion
Tak ing into con sid era tion Hamas’ his tori cal back ground and its ideo logi cal 
evo lu tion schol ars world wide have been able to con struct some very strong ar gu-
ments both in fa vor and against the or gani za tion’s in te gra tion in Pal es tin ian po liti-
cal life. Among the schol ars who have strongly ar gued in fa vor of Hamas’ in clu sion 
are Khaled Hroub, Alastair Crooke, Bev erly Mil ton-Ed wards, Shaul Mis hal and 
Avra ham Sela, while in the op po site camp we en coun ter Mat thew Lewitt, Robert 
Sat loff and Mar tin Kramer.
Ac cord ing to the first, the pres ence of Hamas on the Pal es tin ian po liti cal 
scene and its com pe ti tion with PLO is a defi nite ad van tage. On one hand, Hamas’ 
crea tion led to the es tab lish ment of a sys tem of checks and bal ances within the Pal-
es tin ian po liti cal sys tem. By con stantly chal leng ing the PLO’s de ci sions and ac-
tions, Hamas took upon it self the role of a po liti cal op po si tion. Through its ac tions, 
it tried to pre vent Yasser Arafat and the rul ing party Fat tah from gain ing com plete 
con trol over the Pal es tin ian so ci ety and es tab lish ing a per son al is tic au thori tar ian 
re gime. Sec ondly, by al ways for mu lat ing its strate gies in ac cor dance with the 
needs and de mands of the Pal es tini ans, Hamas has acted as a po liti cal party rep re-
sent ing the in ter ests of a par ticu lar so cial group. Hence its in te gra tion in Pal es tin-
ian poli tics would come as a natu ral step, to wards achiev ing a higher level of 
po liti cal plu ral ism in the Ter ri to ries. While the more secu lar forces within Pal es-
tine were rep re sented by the PLO, the more re li gious fac tions had in turn their 
own rep re sen ta tive, through the voice of Hamas. If we take into con sid era tion the 
fact that both po liti cal plu ral ism and the pres ence of a po liti cal op po si tion are key 
fea tures of de moc racy, then we can safely state that at least from this point of view, 
Hamas’ pres ence proved a stimu lus for Pal es tin ian de moc ra ti za tion.
A third ar gu ment in fa vor of Hamas’ in te gra tion takes into con sid era tion the 
evo lu tion of the peace proc ess. Alastair Crooke and Bev erly Mil ton-Ed wards em-
pha size the fact that a suc cess ful peace set tle ment with Is rael re quires a criti cal 
mass of ground sup port and co he sion3. There fore, a peace proc ess ca pa ble of 
1 Ibidem, pp. 17-18.
2 Ibidem, p. 22.
3 Alastair CROOKE, Beverley MILTON-EDWARDS, ”Elusive Ingredient: Hamas and the 
Peace Process”, Journal of Palestine Studies, vol. 33, no. 4, pp. 39-52/p. 42.
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reach ing a last ing con clu sion must be as in clu sive as pos si ble, re quir ing the sup-
port of all sig nifi cant po liti cal ac tors within the Pal es tin ian Ter ri to ries1. In their 
opin ion, the pos si bil ity of Hamas rec og niz ing Is rael as a po liti cal re al ity is not a 
uto pia if we look at the move ment’s con cept of a long-term cease-fire, which is 
deeply rooted in the Is lamic ap proach to con flict reso lu tion. This con cept can be 
con sid ered an ”in terim op tion” which pro vides Hamas an exit from its for mal po-
si tion de mand ing the re cov ery of all his tori cal Pal es tine2. As men tioned above, 
such ref er ences have been pre sent in Hamas’ rheto ric start ing with the early 1990s 
and re peated since by vari ous spokes men, the most re cently by Prime Min is ter 
Hani yeh in his 2006 speech be fore the Pal es tin ian Par lia ment.
Nev er the less, the ba sic ques tion re mains: can the leop ard change its spots? 
There are schol ars who ar gue that Hamas’ in volve ment in the peace proc ess or 
reso lu tion cease-fire is a stra te gic mis take. They per ceive such par tici pa tion as an 
Islamist strat egy to po si tion them selves bet ter to pur sue armed strug gle in the 
name of Is lam and be gin a proc ess of Islami za tion of Pal es tin ian so ci ety. How ever, 
Crooke and Mil ton-Ed wards chal lenge this opin ion by em pha siz ing Hamas’ con-
stant ideo logi cal trans for ma tion. Ac cord ing to them Hamas has de vel oped a po liti-
cal agenda and ideas that have con sid er able dis tanced the move ment from its 
origi nal 1988 Char ter which called for the lib era tion of Man date Pal es tine. Fur ther-
more, the move ment’s mecha nism for rec og niz ing Is rael, based on the con cept of 
a long-term cease-fire is analo gous to the po liti cal evo lu tion that oc curred at an 
ear lier stage with Fat tah3.
In re gard to the ac cu sa tion that Hamas’ in te gra tion would in evi ta bly lead to 
an Islami za tion of Pal es tin ian so ci ety, the two au thors are equally skep ti cal. It is 
their be lief that it is im pos si ble to pre dict the im pact that re gional Islamist move-
ments may have on the West Bank and Gaza. On the other hand, it is clear the con-
tinua tion of the cur rent socio-po liti cal con di tions can not but strengthen Islam ism’s 
ap peal to the popu la tion as
”in a situa tion where or di nary life sup ports col lapse, when the gov ern ing 
au thor ity fails, em ploy ment evapo rated, food be come scarce and hope is 
aban doned, Islamists of fer a mean ing ful al ter na tive”4.
Nev er the less, re cent events have not sup ported Crooke and Bev er ley Mil-
ton-Ed wards’ the ory as Hamas’ re fusal to dis band its mili tary wing and stop its at-
tacks on Is rael has led to the out break of a new con flict in the Gaza Strip. Not only 
did the peace ne go tia tions not im prove but the peace proc ess was halted en tirely, 
as nei ther the West nor Is rael have ac cepted Hamas as a le giti mate po liti cal ac tor.
A fourth ar gu ment in fa vor of Hamas’ in clu sion has been for mu lated by Mah-
moud Abbas, the new presi dent of the Pal es tin ian Au thor ity. Abbas de cided to 
adopt an en tirely dif fer ent strat egy when deal ing with Hamas than his prede ces-
sor. He opted to deal with the Islamists. Abbas’ agenda con sisted of poli cies aimed 
at sta bi liz ing both the do mes tic and in ter na tional po liti cal en vi ron ment, some thing 
he could not hope to achieve with out Hamas’ co op era tion. In ad di tion, Abbas was 
in ter ested in or ga niz ing new elec tions that would en able him to re move ri val 
1 Ibidem, p. 43.
2 Ibidem, p. 45.
3 Ibidem, p. 49.
4 Ibidem, p. 50.
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Fat tah power cen ters and re gen er ate the Pal es tin ian po liti cal arena. As a con se-
quence, in ex change for co op era tion, he of fered Hamas power-shar ing through in-
te gra tion in PA in sti tu tions on the ba sis of elec tions. He ar gued that once in the 
Pal es tin ian Leg is la tive Coun cil, Hamas could no longer ig nore the laws that were 
passed by it. Hence it would have to re ject ei ther the logic of po liti cal in cor po ra-
tion or the logic of mili tary in de pend ence; it could not em brace them both1.
Abbas’ strat egy was based on the idea that once elected; poli ti cians gen er ally 
fo cus on stay ing in of fice. Con se quently, the ad vo cates of Hamas’ in te gra tion hold 
that Hamas of fi cials will be more con cerned with de liv er ing ser vices and gov ern-
ing than with plan ning and com mit ting acts of ter ror ism. Fur ther more, Hamas’ in-
clu sion would avert the risk of civil war that would push the Pal es tin ian so ci ety 
fur ther on the road to vio lence and au thori tari an ism. Abbas’ ap proach was ad di-
tion ally sup ported by the fact that the Pal es tin ian Au thor ity no longer had the 
means to dis arm Hamas through force. Hence, any at tempt from the part of the 
PA’s se cu rity forces to ar rest Hamas mili tants or con fis cate their weap ons would 
have met vio lent op po si tion2.
Abbas also took into con sid era tion the proc ess of Pal es tin ian de moc ra ti za tion, 
which could not be achieved with out the par tici pa tion of all seg ments of Pal es tin-
ian so ci ety, in clud ing the Islamists. By en cour ag ing Hamas’ in te gra tion Abbas 
hoped to regu late Pal es tin ian poli tics so as to en sure that any di ver gence of views 
could be ex pressed through le giti mate po liti cal chan nels rather than vio lence3.
How ever, Pal es tin ian po liti cal re al ity ap pears to con tra dict Abbas’ strat egy. 
Firstly, af ter ac quir ing po liti cal power Hamas did nei ther elimi nate its mili tary 
wing, nor re nounce ter ror ist ac tivi ties. Sec ondly, in spite of all Abbas’ ef forts a 
civil war did start in 2006 in Pal es tine be tween the ri val fac tions of Fat tah and 
Hamas, a con flict that is still ac tive in 2009. The fact that the two main po liti cal 
groups in the ter ri to ries still con sider mili tary con flict a valid way of solv ing their 
dif fer ences is an in di ca tor of the slow pace of Pal es tin ian de moc ra ti za tion. Al-
though nowa days the pros pect of a unity gov ern ment is yet again on the ne go ti at-
ing ta ble, the re al ity is that Pal es tin ian poli tics are still caught in a dead lock.
The fifth ar gu ment sup port ing Hamas’ posi tive im pact on Pal es tin ian poli tics 
re fers to the le giti macy fac tor. On one hand, by par tici pat ing in elec tions as part of 
the po liti cal sys tem de fined by the PA and cre ated un der the Oslo frame work 
Hamas has con ferred de facto le giti macy on the sys tem. This is a very im por tant 
step for Pal es tin ian de moc ra ti za tion, as elec tions, are ac cord ing to Dahl a fun da-
men tal in sti tu tion of de moc racy. By join ing the elec toral proc ess, Hamas has both 
rec og nized its im por tance and ac cepted its lim its, which marks a posi tive de par-
ture from its pre vi ous ter ror ist be hav ior. In ad di tion, Hamas’ in clu sion con fers the 
Pal es tin ian gov ern ment with a le giti macy that the PA has al ways lacked4. In the 
long term this would al low Pal es tin ian el ites to en gage in a much-needed re form 
of the in sti tu tional sys tem, which would en hance its de moc ratic char ac ter.
A last ar gu ment brought in fa vor of Islamist in te gra tion in Pal es tine takes into 
con sid era tion Hamas’ long ex peri ence with so cial ser vices. It is im por tant to note 
1 ”Enter Hamas: The Challenges of Political Integration”, Crisis Group Middle East Report  
no. 49, 18th January 2006, pp. 1-46/p. 3. 
2 Haim MALKA, ”Forcing Choices: Testing the Transformation of Hamas”, Washington 
Quaterly, vol. 28, no. 4, Autumn 2005, pp. 37-54/p. 43. 
3 Ibidem, p. 44.
4 Ibidem.
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here that Hamas won the 2006 elec tions by pre sent ing an al ter na tive to the cor rup-
tion and in com pe tence of Fat tah. From this per spec tive, the Pal es tin ian so ci ety 
needs a gov ern ment that doesn’t use for eign aid for per sonal pur poses and is dedi-
cated to the solv ing of the criti cal so cial and eco nomic prob lems af fect ing Pal es tin-
ian so ci ety. In this re spect, Hamas has a cer tain ex peri ence, as through out time it 
has de vel oped a so cial wel fare net work which has re placed in a cer tain de gree the 
lack of a state so cial wel fare sys tem. This com mit ment to so cial is sues is re flected 
in the or gani za tion’s elec toral prom ises, as they were summed up by Mah moud 
Za har: the crea tion of an ef fi cient edu ca tion sys tem, the re con struc tion of Pal es tin-
ian in fra struc ture and the es tab lish ment of an ef fi cient health care sys tem1.
Nev er the less, Hamas’ repu ta tion for able ad mini stra tion seemed to crum ble, 
when the or gani za tion was ac tu ally forced to ad dress con crete Pal es tin ian so cial 
prob lems. Its in abil ity to meet the chal lenges of gov ern ance af ter form ing the gov-
ern ment soon be came ob vi ous for eve ry one. In the end, it was this in abil ity that en-
cour aged Hamas to sign the Mecca Agree ment with Fat tah, opt ing for the so lu tion 
of a Na tional Unity Gov ern ment2.
When the or gani za tion en tered of fice on 29 March 2006, the gov ern ment cof-
fers were all but empty, as a re sult of a se ries of po liti cal de ci sions that had elimi-
nated most of the PA’s regu lar in come sources. For ex am ple, the most sig nifi cant 
source of reve nue was the monthly trans fer of $50-60 mil lion in Pal es tin ian taxes 
and fees col lected by Is rael, which was sev ered by the Is raeli gov ern ment af ter 
Hamas’ vic tory. An other im por tant source of reve nue was the di rect and in di rect 
do nor sub ven tions to the PA’s Sin gle Treas ury Ac count, which were halted pur su-
ant to the Quar tet de ci sion to dis con tinue re la tions3.
Con se quently, it be comes clear that the poor per form ance of the Hamas gov-
ern ment was not en tirely its fault. Thus, the ar gu ment in fa vor of Hamas’ in te gra-
tion re mains valid. What needs to be taken into con sid era tion is the fact, that the 
in clu sion of Islamist or gani za tion in the po liti cal proc ess may prove det ri men tal 
for Pal es tin ian poli tics be cause of an in di rect ef fect, such as for eign in ter ven tion. Be-
cause of the fact that the in ter na tional com mu nity a pri ori de cided not to rec og nize 
the Pal es tin ian elec toral op tion and adopted sev eral dras tic eco nomic meas ures, 
we can not ef fi ciently evalu ate Hamas’ per form ance as a gov ern men tal party.
Among the most fer vent crit ics of Hamas’ in te gra tion is West ern scholar, 
Robert Sat loff. From the start he dis misses all ar gu ments in fa vor of Islamist in clu-
sion, by cata log ing them as ei ther na ïve or de feat ist. Sat loff chal lenges the opin-
ion of Al is tair Crooke and Bev er ley Mil ton-Ed wards by stat ing that an ac cep tance 
of Hamas as a le giti mate part ner for ne go tia tions would per ma nently en dan ger 
the en tire peace proc ess, as the or gani za tion will never make peace with Is rael. 
The only two op tions avail able are ei ther a tahdiya (brief lull in fight ing) or a 
hudna (long-term ar mi stice) – nei ther of which ap proxi mates peace, or even rec og-
ni tion of Is rael4.
1 Esther PAN, ”Hamas Role in Palestinian Elections”, December 2005 at Council on Foreign 
Relations, http://www.cfr.org/publications/9485/hamas_role_in_palestinian_elections.html 
(accessed on 01.06.2009). 
2 ”After Mecca: Engaging Hamas”, Crisis Group Middle East Report, no. 62, 28 February 2007, 
pp. 1-40/p. 2.
3 Ibidem.
4 Robert SATLOFF, Robert MALLEY, ”The Hamas Dilemma: A Debate on Alternative 
Strategies”, Policy Watch Special Forum Report, no. 1359, 26th March 2008 at http://www.
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Fur ther more, Sat loff does not be lieve in Hamas’ ca pa bil ity to change. Al-
though the or gani za tion may ex hibit stra te gic flexi bil ity and oc ca sional mod era-
tion, it is highly unlikely to change any as pect of its fun da men tal strat egy. Once in 
gov ern ment, Hamas will be gin by fo cus ing on fight ing cor rup tion and im prov ing 
so cial ser vices and gradu ally pro ceed to Islam ize so cial, cul tural and edu ca tion 
life in Pal es tin ian so ci ety. Hamas’ im me di ate ob jec tive is ac cord ing to Sat loff to ex-
pand and deepen its con trol over all as pects of Pal es tin ian so ci ety1.
More over, the au thor puts forth three main ar gu ments against Hamas’ in te-
gra tion. Firstly, by vot ing for Hamas, Pal es tini ans have ex pressed their sup port 
for a party that ad vo cates vio lent ji had as a form of achiev ing Pal es tin ian le giti-
mate rights2. From this per spec tive, Hamas’ vic tory in stead of sym bol iz ing a new 
stage of Pal es tin ian de moc ra ti za tion is ac tu ally a step back wards to ward a vio lent 
ap proach on poli tics.
Sec ondly, the case of Hamas can not be com pared to that of other mod er ate 
Islamist move ments par tici pat ing in elec tions be cause sev eral key fac tors are ab-
sent. The rela tively few suc cess ful ex am ples of co op ta tion of Is lamic par ties, such 
as Tur key, oc curred only in coun tries that en joyed strong in sti tu tions, pow er ful se-
cu rity ap pa ra tuses and a su preme guar an tor of the sanc tity of the po liti cal sys tem. 
Nei ther of these ele ments can be found in the Pal es tin ian case3. Hence, the ar gu-
ment that the in clu sion of Islamist groups has had no re corded nega tive ef fects is 
not ap pli ca ble in this case.
Thirdly, Sat loff draws the at ten tion on the long-term ef fects that Hamas’ in clu-
sion would have on the Pal es tin ian so ci ety. He criti cizes those schol ars who ar gue 
in fa vor of Islamist in clu sion by stat ing that once in power Islamist move ments 
fail in gov ern ment, thus un der min ing the ap peal of the Islamist model. It is his be-
lief that this type of ap proach over looks the po ten tial of radi cal Islamist par ties, 
who once in power may de cide to main tain their po si tion de spite po liti cal fail ure4. 
How ever, Sat loff’s last ar gu ment does not con firm in re al ity, as none of the Islamist 
groups gain ing po liti cal power through par tici pa tion in elec tions has re fused to 
step down at the end of their man date.
Sat loff’s opin ion has been shared by two other re nowned West ern schol ars, 
Mat thew Lewitt and Mar tin Kramer. The first be lieves that Hamas’ par tici pa tion 
in the elec toral proc ess is a way of ful fill ing the group’s main ob jec tive of un der-
min ing the Pal es tin ian secu lar au thor ity and pro mot ing its vio lent Is lamic agenda. 
In sup port to this claim, Levitt bring a di rect quote from Mah moud Za har one of 
Hamas’ lead ers who states that ”Hamas’ par tici pa tion in the par lia men tary elec-
tions will com pletely de stroy the Oslo Ac cords5”.
Simi larly to Sat loff, Mar tin Kramer ques tions the ve rac ity of Hamas’ ideo logi-
cal shift, which he be lieves to be only su per fi cial rheto ric. To sup port his ar gu ment, 
Kramer makes ref er ences to the or gani za tion’s his tory. Ac cord ing to him, Hamas 
has ac quired po liti cal power much too eas ily. Be fore 2006, Hamas has never sat in 
washingtoninstitute.org/templateC05.php?CID=2735 (accessed on 09.06.2009).
1 Robert SATLOFF, ”Hamas Triumphant: Implications for Security, Politics, Economy 
and Strategy”, Policy Focus, Washington Institute for Near East Policy,  no. 53, February 2006, 
pp. 1-63/p. 5.
2 Ibidem, p. 7.
3 Ibidem, p. 8.
4 Ibidem.
5 Matthew LEVITT, Hamas…cit., p. 240.
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op po si tion, joined a lar ger coa li tion or ac cepted any type of com pro mise. As we 
can not speak of a long-term com mit ment to po liti cal par tici pa tion, it is only natu ral 
to ques tion the or gani za tion’s sud den de sire to en gage in le gal po liti cal ac tiv ity1.
Fur ther more, by ac quir ing power so eas ily, with lit tle com pro mise, Hamas 
has been able to pre serve its mili tary wing in tact. Kramer’s be lief is that in such a 
situa tion the or gani za tion has no in cen tive to trans form. In stead, Hamas can fo-
cus on its three main goals. First, it will seek to con soli date its con trol over all Pal-
es tin ian in sti tu tions in the det ri ment of Fat tah. Sec ond, it will gradu ally pro ceed 
to Islam ize Pal es tin ian life. And third, it will im pose its own view of the Pal es tin-
ian fu ture, drift ing away from the pro posed two-state so lu tion2. By im ple ment ing 
these ob jec tives, the Hamas gov ern ment would ef fec tively put an end to Pal es tin-
ian de moc ra ti za tion.
Kramer and Sat loff’s ar gu ments ap pear to be sup ported by some in flam ma-
tory state ments made by the or gani za tion’s main lead ers. For ex am ple, Khaled 
Mis hal stated that in more than one oc ca sion that the de moc racy pre ferred by the 
United States and its al lies is a de moc racy that fits the norms and agenda of those 
states, but is com pletely dif fer ent from that of Hamas. The Hamas ver sion of de-
moc racy is based on the Is lamic de moc racy which has as a found ing prin ci ple di-
vine sov er eignty3.
On the other hand, there is lit tle evi dence yet of Hamas of fi cials seek ing to im-
ple ment the Shari’a, ei ther at a lo cal or na tional level. More over, where vigi lan tes 
or ”mo ral ity po lice” have sur faced, Hamas of fi cials have been quick to char ac ter-
ize them as iso lated in ci dents and not gen eral pol icy4. Mis hal him self has claimed 
that Hamas does not in tend, at this stage to ap ply the Shari’a within the Pal es tin-
ian Au thor ity5.
In ad di tion to the au thors pre vi ously men tioned, there is an other cate gory of 
schol ars who have adopted a mid dle path re gard ing Hamas’ in te gra tion. Among 
them is David Makovsky who sup ports Hamas’ par tici pa tion in poli tics, as he con sid-
ers it a sign of Pal es tin ian de moc ra ti za tion. He in tro duces, how ever one im por tant 
con di tion. Ac cord ing to Makovsky the in ter na tional com mu nity must stay united 
and force Hamas to choose be tween its po liti cal and mili tary wings. To grant de 
facto le giti macy to the or gani za tion would be wrong, as it would un der mine Pal es-
tin ian mod er ates6.
All in all, a com pari son of the ar gu ments men tioned above with the po liti cal 
re al ity in the Pal es tin ian Ter ri to ries can not lead to any valid con clu sions. The 
strong de ter mi na tion of both the Quar tet and Is rael not to rec og nize Hamas as a le giti-
mate po liti cal ac tor makes it al most im pos si ble for any re search to ef fi ciently evalu-
ate the im pact of Hamas’ in te gra tion in Pal es tin ian poli tics. Al though, up un til now 
Hamas did nei ther at tempt to Islam ize Pal es tin ian so ci ety or tried to unlaw fully 
1 Martin KRAMER, Power Will Not Moderate Hamas, 27 March 2006 at http://www.
washingtoninstitute.org/print.php?template=C06&CID=919 (accessed on 02.06.2009).
2 Ibidem.
3 Asaf MALIACH, ”Hamas’ Post-Election Strategy: Step-by-step to the liberation of 
Palestine”, 5 February 2006 at http://insct.syr.edu/Events_and_Lectures/IDC_Videoconference/
Hamas%20reading.htm (accessed on 02.06.2009).
4 ”Enter Hamas…cit.”, p. 13.
5 Asaf MALIACH, ”Hamas’ Post-Election Strategy…cit.”.
6 David MAKOVSKY, Don’t Make Exceptions for Hamas, 24 January 2006 at http://www.
washingtoninstitute.org/templateC06.php?CID=892 (accessed on 02.06.2009).
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in crease its power within Pal es tin ian in sti tu tions, this does not mean it has had a 
posi tive im pact on Pal es tin ian de moc ra ti za tion. On the con trary, a re sult of Hamas’ 
in te gra tion was the out break of a civil war, a wors en ing of socio-eco nomic con di-
tions in the Ter ri to ries and fi nally the out break of a new mili tary con flict with Is rael 
in Gaza. Fur ther more, the in ter na tional com mu nity has put and end to all peace ne-
go tia tions as long as Hamas stays in power. There fore, it is my be lief that more time 
has to pass in or der for schol ars to be able to draw some rele vant con clu sion re gard-
ing the im pact of Islamist in clu sion on the de moc ra ti za tion proc ess in Pal es tine.
